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Using Taxes to Improve Cap and Trade, Part II:
Efficient Pricing
by David Gamage and Darien Shanske
How should we combat global warming? As we discussed
in our prior article on this topic,1 cap-and-trade regimes
have become the preferred approach. This is especially so at
the state level, with California’s cap-and-trade regime (AB
32) being a prime example. In this series of essays we explore
how state-level cap-and-trade regimes can be improved by
incorporating tax elements.
Our central purpose in these essays is to critique some
aspects of the structure of California’s cap-and-trade regime
and suggest how this regime should be reformed in light of
our critiques.2 We secondarily intend for these articles to be
instructive as to important issues involved in the design of
cap-and-trade regimes outside California — especially in
other states. Our first article explained how tax elements
could improve a cap-and-trade regime by making the regime
fairer to the disadvantaged. This article explains how tax
elements can mitigate a cap-and-trade regime’s impact on
economic growth, thereby making the regime more efficient
for everyone. Our third article will explain how states might
incorporate border adjustments into a cap-and-trade re-
gime.
For a number of interrelated reasons, this is a particularly
apt time to consider how California’s cap-and-trade regime
might be improved. We are rapidly approaching 2020, the
date the cap-and-trade program is scheduled to end. The
California Air Resources Board (CARB) recently an-
nounced that it plans to extend the program,3 but there is a
legal dispute as to whether CARB can do so.4 If CARB
cannot, there is a further legal question whether a vote of the
State Legislature to expand the program must achieve a
two-thirds supermajority, which will be difficult to achieve.
Whether a supermajority is required depends on whether, as
a matter of California constitutional law, the cap-and-trade
regime imposes a ‘‘tax.’’ A tax requires a two-thirds superma-
jority approval.5 There is, of course, already litigation chal-
lenging whether the original vote establishing AB 32 re-
quired a supermajority vote in 2006.6 Even if cap and trade
survives this challenge, the California Constitution was
amended in 2010 in a manner that makes the argument for
a supermajority vote stronger if AB 32 must be extended by
a vote of the Legislature.7 Amid all of this uncertainty, and
1Gamage and Shanske, ‘‘Using Taxes to Improve Cap and Trade,
Part I: Distribution,’’ State Tax Notes, Jan. 12, 2015, p. 99.
2This series of essays grows out of policy advisory work we con-
sulted on in regard to California’s cap-and-trade system (AB 32).
3Dan Walters, ‘‘Brown’s ARB Makes a Sly and Maybe Risky Move
in Carbon Chess Game,’’ The Sacramento Bee, July 14, 2016, available
at http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/politics-colum
ns-blogs/dan-walters/article89670287.html#storylink=cpy. The de-
tails of the proposal are in California Air Resources Board, ‘‘Prelimi-
nary Draft Proposed Regulation Order and Staff Report,’’ July 12,
2016, available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/draft-ct-
reg_071216.pdf.
4See id.
5Cal. Const. Art. 13A, Sec. 3. For further commentary, see gener-
ally Joseph Grodin, Michael Salreno, and Shanske, The California State
Constitution (2015) (note that one of the authors of this column
[Shanske] was the primary author on the sections relating to Califor-
nia’s fiscal constitution).
6California Chamber of Commerce v. California Air Resources Board,
Nos. C075930, C075954 (Cal. Ct. App.), available at https://www.
edf.org/climate/california-cap-and-trade-auction-legal-resources.
7Though not compelling, at least to us.
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likely in part because of it, only about 10 percent of available
allowances were purchased at the most recent cap-and-trade
auction.8
Our articles do not attempt to solve the problems caused
by this legal uncertainty, though we will give our two cents
on the issues. But we think that we can suggest design
elements that could improve the program.
AB 32 prices allowances through an auction mechanism
wherein both CARB and entities to which allowances are
given will sell allowances for other entities to purchase. This
auction mechanism represents the ‘‘trade’’ in cap and trade.
The purpose of the auction is to create a pricing system so
that the entities that can reduce their emissions at the lowest
cost will be encouraged to do so, with the entities that would
need to incur higher costs to reduce their emissions provided
incentives to purchase allowances.
In theory, an auction-based cap-and-trade system can
reduce emissions as cost effectively as can a carbon tax, with
the key mechanism used to control the magnitude of emis-
sions being the total number of allowances made available
instead of the tax rate. However, in practice, cap-and-trade
systems must resolve numerous administrative and imple-
mentation problems.9 Two central concerns are (1) the
potential for price volatility or market manipulation and (2)
the potential for insufficient trading volume. AB 32 con-
tains several provisions designed to address these two con-
cerns. Nevertheless, as we will explain, further reforms could
improve how AB 32 prices allowances.
To begin with, consider the concern related to the poten-
tial for price volatility or market manipulation. As the total
number of allowances made available is reduced to control
emissions, there is a danger that the auction price for emis-
sions might rise much higher than anticipated, potentially
causing excessive economic harm. AB 32 addresses this
concern by establishing an allowance price containment
reserve and authorizing the banking of allowances. The
price containment reserve essentially works as a price ceiling
— a price at which applicable entities could purchase their
entire quantity of needed allowances from the government
at a price significantly higher than the anticipated auction
price. For example, for 2014 CARB offered to start selling a
large number of allowances out of its allowance price con-
tainment reserve at $42.38 per allowance, while the reserve
price for 2014 was $11.34.10 In the August 2014 auction,
the market cleared at a price of $11.50, just above the reserve
price, so there was no need to sell allowances out of the
reserve.11
Introducing a price ceiling is, in effect, placing a carbon
tax safeguard on AB 32. If the auction price of emissions
ever exceeded the price ceiling, entities could purchase
allowances directly from the government at the ceiling price
rather than through the auction — effectively paying a
per-unit tax on emissions equal to the price ceiling. To
ensure that AB 32 meets its emission reduction goals, the
price ceiling gradually increases over time.
A price ceiling protects against price volatility or market
manipulation, resulting in a much higher auction price than
anticipated. The corollary to a price ceiling for protecting
against prices being much lower than anticipated is a reserve
price. AB 32 includes a reserve price provision that initially
sets a reserve price of $10 per ton, with this reserve price
scheduled to increase over time. As noted above, that reserve
price was $11.34 in 2014; in fact the market clearing price
has been only slightly above the reserve price, even for the
successful auctions.12 The reserve price for the August 2016
auction is $12.73.13
The demand for allowances is a function of both the
number of allowances given away and the cost that entities
must incur to reduce emissions. If entities face lower costs to
reduce emissions than anticipated and/or too many emis-
sions have been given away, such that the market clearing
price is lower than the reserve price, the auctions will fail.
This is not an imagined horrible, as it has arguably afflicted
the European carbon trading regime, which also has seen
lower than expected allowance prices.14 Prominent analysts
believe this may be part of the reason for California’s recent
problems.15 Indeed, as part of its recent regulatory proposal
8Ralph Vartabedian, ‘‘State Cap-and-Trade Auction Falls Far Short,
Hurting Bullet Train,’’ Los Angeles Times, May 25, 2016, available at
http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-cap-trade- 20160525-
snap-story.html. For further analysis, see Danny Cullenward and Andy
Coghlan, ‘‘Structural Supply and Credibility in California’s Carbon
Market,’’ 29 The Electricity Journal 7 (2016). For interested readers
without access to this journal, the article is well summarized at Timo-
thy Taylor, ‘‘The Collapse of California’s Carbon Cap-and-Trade
Market,’’ the Conversable Economist blog (July 15, 2016), available at
http://conversableeconomist.blogspot.ca/2016/07/the-collapse-of-
californias-carbon-cap.html.
9And these problems are more severe than the challenge posed in
implementing a carbon tax. Michael Wara, ‘‘Instrument Choice, Car-
bon Emissions, and Information,’’ 4 Mich. J. Envtl. & Admin. L. 261
(2015), available at http://repository.law.umich.edu/mjeal/vol4/
iss2/2.
10California Air Resource Board, ‘‘2014 Annual Auction Reserve
Price Notice’’ (2014), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capan
dtrade/auction/2014_annual_reserve_price_notice_updated.pdf.
11California Air Resource Board, ‘‘2014 August Auction Summary
Report’’ (2014), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/
auction/august- 2014/results.pdf.
12Cullenward and Coghlan, supra note 8.
13California Air Resource Board, ‘‘Auction Notice: California Cap-
and-Trade Program and Quebec Cap-and-Trade System Joint Auction
of Greenhouse Gas Allowances on August 16, 2016,’’ available at
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/auction/aug- 2016/notice.pdf.
14A. Denny Ellerman et al., ‘‘The European Union Emissions
Trading System: Ten Years and Counting,’’ 10 Review of Environmental
Economics and Policy 89, 103 (2016).
15Cullenward and Coghlan identify three likely drivers for the
recent weakness in the auction market. First, as already mentioned,
there is the legal uncertainty. Second, there may be too many allow-
ances, and this is at least partially a result of the fact that CARB has
made it too easy for California utilities to shift to cleaner energy. This
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to extend AB 32, CARB included several regulatory changes
that would reduce the number of allowances, which suggests
CARB also sees a surfeit of allowances as a problem.16 By
2020 about half of all allowances are planned to have been
given away.17
If all allowances were sold rather than given away, con-
cerns related to the potential for auctions to fail due to the
reserve price exceeding the market clearing price would be
greatly alleviated. This is because there would be only one
main axis along which the governing calculations could go
astray: the cost of reducing emissions being less than ex-
pected and hence the reserve price being too high.
Nevertheless, commentators seem to agree that many
allowances must be given away for political reasons, though
they note that the Northeast Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative (RGGI) sells all of its allowances.18 Yet this is an
exception, and in any event California’s regime is already in
place, so let us assume that it is no longer possible to sell all
of California’s allowances. Is there another taxlike solution
to the challenge of successful auctions given this political
reality?
We believe there is: Emitters covered by AB 32 should be
given tradable or salable tax credits to purchase allowances,
rather than the allowances themselves.19 What is the differ-
ence between giving away allowances and giving away cred-
its to buy allowances? One key difference is that all emitters
would need to enter the market to buy allowances, thereby
making the market more robust.20 This should reduce the
risk of auction failure.
There might also be a cognitive payoff.21 Part of the
challenge of cap and trade is that businesses must grow
accustomed to the notion that they must pay for something
that had previously been free — at least free to them.
Granting allowances permits emitters to continue to per-
ceive emissions as free, so the mere act of being forced to
purchase an allowance, even if it will ultimately be refunded,
could be significant. Further, because the credits are salable,
an emitter would still have an incentive to undertake low-
cost mitigation measures so as to need to buy fewer allow-
ances.
In sum, because so many allowances have already been
given away, with many more permits expected to be given
away, continued auction failure is a real threat, especially
given the legal uncertainties. To alleviate this threat, at least
in part, we propose that emitters be given tradable or salable
tax credits to purchase allowances, rather than the allow-
ances themselves. Incorporating this tax element into AB 32
would mitigate the risks to economic growth, promising a
more efficient approach for combating global warming.
Concluding Thoughts on the
Legal Challenges to AB 32
One response to this article (and the previous article)
could be that adopting additional tax elements into AB 32
would kill the patient legally (and politically) in order to
save it economically. That is, whatever the current analysis
of whether AB 32 imposes a tax, adding tax elements will
only make the case stronger that it is a tax for constitutional
purposes. There is some merit to this concern, especially
since we do not believe that the tax-vs.-fee distinction can —
or should — bear the enormous weight that has been placed
on it.22 Nevertheless, we think that as a matter of California
constitutional law, AB 32 does not impose a tax and that
none of the reforms we have proposed would change that.
To understand our confidence on this point,23 consider
another explanation for the recent auction failure: Busi-
nesses are not purchasing allowances, because they do not
need them, and they do not need them because the busi-
nesses have discovered cost-effective ways to reduce their
emissions. This is obviously the goal of the program, and it
is not far-fetched to imagine it succeeding dramatically.24
The cap-and-trade regime in sulfur dioxide (the chemical
is a problem because the California utilities have simply swapped
dirtier sources of energy with non-California utilities without actually
achieving any net carbon reduction. The third reason, discussed infra,
has to do with the success of the rest of California’s regulatory appara-
tus in reducing emissions.
16See, e.g., Preliminary Draft Proposed Regulation Order and Staff
Report, supra note 3, at 12-13.
17Legislative Analyst’s Office, ‘‘2014-15 Budget: Cap-and-Trade
Auction Revenue Expenditure Plan’’ at 3.
18Bruce R. Huber, ‘‘How Did RGGI Do It? Political Economy and
Emissions Auctions,’’ 40 Ecology L.Q. 59 (2013).
19For elaboration on this proposal and similar alternatives, see
Mark Gergen, ‘‘The Case in Economic Theory for Wrapping a Carbon
Tax Around Cap and Trade’’ (2013) (draft essay on file with authors).
20Another difference could be that administering the credits
through the tax system could allow the state to meet some distribu-
tional goals.
21For some of our prior writings on tax cognition and tax salience,
see Gamage, ‘‘On the Future of Tax Salience Scholarship: Operative
Mechanisms and Limiting Factors,’’ 41 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 173 (2013);
Andrew Hayashi, Brent Nakamura, and Gamage, ‘‘Experimental Evi-
dence of Tax Salience and the Labor-Leisure Decision: Anchoring, Tax
Aversion, or Complexity?’’ 41 Public Finance Review 203 (2013);
Gamage and Shanske, ‘‘Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market Salience
and Political Salience,’’ 65 Tax L. Rev. 19 (2011).
22Gamage and Shanske, ‘‘On Tax Increase Limitations: Part II —
Evasion and Transcendence,’’ State Tax Notes, Apr. 23, 2012, p. 245;
Gamage and Shanske, ‘‘On Tax Increase Limitations: Part I — A
Costly Incoherence,’’ State Tax Notes, Dec. 19, 2011, p. 813.
23This is not to say that we are confident the California courts will
agree, just that they should. At the time of this writing, there were
arguably indications that an appellate court was going to find that AB
32 amounts to a tax. See Walters, supra note 3.
24Frank Wolak, a Stanford economist, suggested this as a possibility
to the Los Angeles Times. Chris Megerian and Ralph Vartabedian,
‘‘California’s Cap-and-Trade Program Faces Daunting Hurdles to
Avoid Collapse,’’ Los Angeles Times, June 14, 2016, available at http://
www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-sac-climate-change-challenges-20160
614-snap-story.html. Prominent economists have also argued that this
might in part explain the drop in price of European allowances. See
Ellerman et al., supra note 14.
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that causes acid rain), the first big test for the cap-and-trade
concept, was a big and speedy success.25 Remember, part of
the idea behind cap and trade is to put an implicit price on
an externality that had never been priced before, and so
there might indeed be lots of low-hanging emissions reduc-
tions. Further, the genius of cap and trade is to provide
incentives for those emitters that can most cheaply reduce
emissions to do so and then profit from selling their allow-
ances to emitters that face higher costs in reducing their
emissions.
Granted, the program’s success is not the most likely
explanation for the problems with the last auction, at least in
general, but the conceptual point is that it well could be.
And the reason could be that this is a program with a
regulatory goal, not a revenue-raising goal. Indeed, and by
design, California’s cap-and-trade program is only one small
part of a larger regulatory program. Right from the start of
cap and trade, CARB anticipated that more traditional
command-and-control regulations would lead to 80 percent
of the greenhouse gas reductions.26 Therefore, auction rev-
enue is also vulnerable to the success of the vast majority of
the remainder of the regulatory regime because why should
an emitter purchase an allowance if regulations are already
forcing him to reduce his emissions below the cap? Accord-
ingly, the success of the rest of the regulatory regime is also a
reason that prominent commentators believe explain the
recent poor auction results.27
Receipts from cap and trade thus do not resemble the
receipts that governments collect from taxation. An income
tax might, at the margins, suppress the earning of income,
but the success of the income tax is its ability to regularly
finance the ordinary operation of government while not
causing too many economic inefficiencies. Volatility is a
major knock against a tax. In general, there is a fortiori not
an entire regulatory apparatus meant to suppress the base of
the income tax, sales tax, or property tax.28
It is precisely because general taxes go to the broad
financing of government functions that taxes are considered
by some — including the people of California — a special
case requiring supermajorities. Anyone’s tax dollars can go
to finance a broad category of projects, so the concern is that
a minority will be taxed to support a bare majority. Because
cap and trade is designed to mitigate an externality, it is not
well-designed to finance the general workings of govern-
ment and hence cannot be a tool of majority oppression in
this way. We are not claiming that revenue from cap and
trade has been spent on general government functions. To
the contrary, there has been a deliberate effort to spend the
revenue only on greenhouse gas mitigation. Yet even as to
these projects, including high-speed rail, the recent auc-
tion’s failure demonstrates why the revenue from this regu-
latory program is not to be relied on like tax revenue.
There is, of course, much more to be said about these
matters.29 Our point is just that what we take to be the
knockdown argument that cap-and-trade revenue is not tax
revenue as a legal matter is not affected by whether a
cap-and-trade regime is improved with the tax elements we
have discussed in our two articles.
25Jonathan Gruber, Public Finance and Public Policy 154-55
(2013).
26Michael Wara, ‘‘California’s Energy and Climate Policy: A Full
Plate, but Perhaps Not a Model Policy,’’ 70 Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists 26 (2014).
27Cullenward and Coghlan, supra note 8.
28It could be objected that sin taxes are meant to mitigate negative
externalities. Surely a cigarette tax is a tax, even if it is also meant to
reduce smoking and there are many regulations that complement
cigarette taxes in order to reduce smoking. Yet the cases are distinguish-
able. The difference is in the assumed elasticities of the different
activities. It is assumed that people will continue to smoke, if slowly less
frequently; hence, this is a tax that provides a stable source of revenue
even as it also contributes to a regulatory objective. Cap and trade is
premised on the assumption that the ability of our economy to reduce
its use of carbon is much greater than the ability of tobacco users to
quit.
29For instance, Proposition 26 seems to expand the definition of a
tax to include regulatory fees, which would seem to be the broad
category into which cap-and-trade revenue would fall. We disagree. We
think that the better reading of Proposition 26 is that it bars regulatory
fees that are retroactive and hence only tenuously connected to affect-
ing behavior. Shanske, ‘‘Going Forward by Going Backward to Benefit
Taxes,’’ 3(2) California Journal of Politics and Policy (2011), available at
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/1bt4928f.
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